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Preliminary Evaluation of the Disease Surveillance System During Influenza 
Outbreaks of Pandemic Scale 
Abstract 
In the United States it is currently unknown whether the influenza surveillance system is capable of 
producing timely and accurate data for case estimation during an outbreak of pandemic scale. This 
simulation provides a preliminary evaluation of the surveillance system’s ability to collect data and 
produce timely and accurate trends of cases confirmed with an influenza virus. For the evaluation, a 
computer-based simulation of the data-collection process was used, which was validated with real 
demographic and epidemiologic information. The results were analyzed to determine the most significant 
behavioral and operational factors influencing the data collection and to propose the exploration of more 
efficient data-collection policies for the generation of timely and accurate trends of confirmed cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
andemic influenza (PI) outbreaks are unpredictable and potentially devastating public 
health issues. This unpredictable behavior necessitates proper outbreak management as the 
disease progresses. In the U.S., one of the most important information sources comes from 
data collected by the state viral surveillance labs (VSL). This information is in turn reported 
to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which aggregates other reports of confirmed 
cases to present a final daily number per state and to estimate pandemic trends. 
During a pandemic influenza outbreak, the capacity of the VSL is generally exceeded due to the 
high demand of testing services, which are offered for free. This tendency forces the VSL to 
restrict the arrival of specimens from healthcare providers, based on operational factors of the 
surveillance system. The effect of these operational factors, along with other behavioral factors 
of the population could result in a distorted view of the outbreak’s epidemiologic features, a 
delay in accurate information, and unnecessary costs. 
A screening experiment was performed to explore the effect of different factors in the disease 
predictive error of a trend of confirmed cases, using an agent-based simulation of disease spread.  
AGENT-BASED SIMULATION 
The sampling and testing of specimens were simulated in an urban population. This model is 
developed on top of an existing agent-based model that simulates the spread of a pandemic 
influenza H1N1 virus, and one of its seasonal antigenic variants (SI). Both viruses are seeded in 
a population that considers schools, workplaces, and errand places. The simulation was 
populated using information from the Hillsborough County in Tampa, Florida. The data collected 
for the simulation were obtained from the 2002 U.S. Economic Census, the 2001 American 
Community Survey, and the 2001 National Household Travel Survey. For a population of 
1,000,000, a total of 12,800 businesses and 500,000 households were simulated.  
The underlying influenza spread model described in Prieto and Das 2014
1
 was used. Under this 
model, and in the absence of containment measures, an infected individual contacts a susceptible 
according to the following probabilities: 
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Where  
s
PIhtp ,,  and 
a
PIhtp ,,  are the probabilities that a susceptible individual is infected at her household at 
time t  by either a symptomatic( s ), or an asymptomatic ( a ) PI individual.  
s
PIR  is the number of infected PI cases that are created by an already infected case. Note that a 
similar set of equations exist for SI ( s SIhtp ,, ,
a
SIhtp ,, ). Values of 
s
PIR =1.8, and 
s
SIR =1.3 were used as 
the reproduction numbers for the PI and the seasonal influenza viruses, respectively.  
P 
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 tws  and  twa  are the infectiousness profiles of an individual depending on her symptomatic 
status. The  tws  of the H1N1 was used for both viruses and was extracted from empirical 
studies on the viral shedding of symptomatic volunteers
2 
 (Figure 1 is an example of  tws ). 
htc , , wtc , , and otc , are the number of contacts made by the infectious case during a day in her 
household ( h ), workplace ( w ), or other errand places (o ). These contacts are generated by the 
simulation model.
2
 The factors h , w , and o  account for closeness and duration of contacts. 
s  is the probability of an infected being symptomatic, and s
PI
a
PI
R
R
 . 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of a viral shedding profile for influenza 
 
Simulating the collection of specimens. The simulated collection process is represented in 
Figure 2. Once individuals get sick from influenza, they seek health care with probability shp . 
Factor levels shp  are 0.5 and 0.25, and were based on estimates from Internet surveys conducted 
during the 2009 pandemic.
3
 The additional parameters in Figure 2 are justified as follows: 
 
For probability of severity ( sp ), the following levels were tested: 0.05, 0.15, 0.25. These levels 
are slightly higher compared to the hospitalization estimates in Shrestha et al.4 to account for 
severe cases that were not hospitalized and to better represent scenarios of higher testing 
demand. The probability of being in a facility ( tfp ) was investigated through sensitivity analysis 
(level were 0.1, 0.5, 0.9).  
 
The probability that a patient has the ability to pay for an onsite lab test is wpp . The levels 0.5, 
0.7, 0.9, were used, based on the chances that a U.S. patient has private insurance or Medicaid.
5
 
Rapid influenza diagnostic tests were not included as part of the simulation as they were not 
accurate enough to influence physicians’ decisions to submit samples to the VSL. 
 
Simulating the testing of specimens. The aim here was to replicate the operation of one of the 
real VSL. The extreme theoretical maximum of the VSL in Tampa is around 1000 specimens per 
day, under pandemic conditions (personal communication, Dr. Lillian Stark, retired virologist from 
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the Florida Bureau of Laboratories). Using this upper bound, L=300 and L=600 were chosen as 
more plausible lab capacity levels to be explored in the simulation. The samples sent to the lab 
are processed on a first-in–first-out policy. If the number of samples received is greater than the 
lab capacity, the backlog of samples is processed the next day. If a sample waits for 3 days 
without being processed, it is discarded as unusable. The assumption was that all samples tested 
are correctly classified as the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test used has a very high 
sensitivity and specificity. This testing results in a daily count of confirmed pandemic cases. 
 
Individuals seeking 
healthcare
Severe Not Severe
sP1
shP
Sample submitted On site lab testing
No on site lab 
testing
Patient has ability to 
pay
Patient does not 
have ability to pay
Sample not 
submitted
Sample submitted
Sample not 
submitted
wpP
wpP1
tfP tfP1
sP
 
Figure 2. Process of the collection and submission of influenza specimens to the state viral 
surveillance labs 
 
EVALUATION OF THE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
The performance of the system was measured through the disease predictive error (DPE), which 
can be defined as follows: 
Let kju be the estimator of the reproduction number fitted for the series of pandemic cases, in 
each factor level combination k , and simulation replicate j .  
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Let kjc be the estimator of the reproduction number fitted for the series of lab confirmed 
pandemic cases. 
Values for kju  and kjc  can be obtained respectively with the Lotka-Euler equations
6
:
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Where jr  is the exponential growth rate of the pandemic case series for each j in the combination
k . A final value of ku was obtained by averaging the reproduction numbers kju  of all the 
simulation replicates in the combination. A final value for kc was obtained similarly. The disease 
predictive error (DPE) is then calculated as 
kkk cuDPE  . Note that lower DPEs indicate 
more accurate estimations of the real pandemic trend. Several scenarios were replicated and the 
DPE was observed in each replicate. Analysis of variance and multiple comparison tests were 
performed after running the experiment. 
 
RESULTS  
A total of 108 scenarios resulted from all the possible factor-level combinations (i.e., 2 levels for 
shp , 3 levels for sp , 3 for tfp , 3 for wpp  and 2 for L). Each scenario was replicated 20 times. To 
analyze the effect of factors in the differences between the estimations, a full factorial design of 
experiments was performed. The test shows that all five factors were significant at 5% 
significance (i.e., 05.0 ). Most of the two-way factor interactions were also significant, with 
the exception of the interaction between shp  and wpp . 
 
From the multiple comparisons tests, we observed that increasing VSL capacity increases the 
DPE accuracy. This seems reasonable as an increased capacity allows the daily testing of 
otherwise expiring samples, and refines the estimate of the number of confirmed cases per day. 
In addition, it was observed that the factor combinations yielding lower numbers of VSL 
submissions tend to produce more accurate values for the kDPE . For example, as the seeking 
healthcare behavior ( shp ) decreases, fewer individuals are eligible for testing ( tfp ), which 
reduces the number of samples discarded by VSL.  
 
DISCUSSION 
A screening experiment was performed to explore the effect of different factors in the disease 
predictive error of a trend of confirmed cases, using an agent-based simulation of disease spread 
in an urban population. Although the experiment is a very simple abstraction of the reality, it 
unravels some of the patterns that seem to be true in a real situation of specimen sampling and 
testing. 
42
Frontiers in Public Health Services and Systems Research, Vol. 4, No. 3 [2015], Art. 1
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/frontiersinphssr/vol4/iss3/1
DOI: 10.13023/FPHSSR.0403.01
To our knowledge, existing VSL receive and test specimens at their order of arrival (i.e., first-in 
first-out). With this practice, VSL can increase the DPE accuracy if the VSL lab capacity is 
increased. As it is expensive to increase lab capacity, VSL managers might consider other testing 
strategies, such as testing as many specimens as the existing capacity permits, and selecting those 
specimens at random out of the pool of arriving specimens. Another strategy is to forecast the 
testing capacity by using existing trends such us Google Flu and Flu Near You. Such strategies 
are still under evaluation and our plan is to provide results on their performance in the near 
future. 
From these findings, what is perhaps more surprising is that the levels of factors that contribute 
to the reduction of the specimen testing load are contributing to the DPE accuracy. Lower factor 
levels result in fewer samples submitted to the VSL, which reduces the number of samples 
discarded. These results might suggest that screening policies for restricting the number of 
specimens to test seem to also increase the DPE accuracy. Several states implemented these 
strategies during the 2009 pandemic. For example, in Michigan, specimen testing was restricted 
by recommending only the submission of high-risk clinical cases (e.g., hospitalized pregnant 
women and the elderly) to the state labs. Policies like this one might be tested for their impact in 
the DPE using modeling approaches like the one proposed in this study. If the policies prove to 
be effective in increasing DPE accuracy, such screening practices might be recommended for 
routine surveillance. 
 
SUMMARY BOX 
What is already known about this topic? There has been considerable research on estimating 
confirmed pandemic influenza cases from real outbreak information. However, it is currently 
unknown whether the influenza surveillance system is capable of producing timely and accurate 
data for case estimation as the pandemic outbreak progresses. Such information can reduce the 
uncertainty in the operational decisions to control the outbreak. 
 
What is added by this report? This report provides a preliminary evaluation of the surveillance 
system’s ability to produce timely and accurate case-confirmed data from a pandemic influenza 
outbreak. This preliminary evaluation showed that each factor tested in the model has a 
significant effect in the timeliness and accuracy of case-confirmed data. In addition, by the initial 
observation of the factors, we were able to propose the exploration of policies for more efficient 
and affordable data collection.  
 
What are the implications for public health practice, policy, and research? These results 
validate current practices for specimen screening and increased testing capacity. However, it is 
important to consider more cost-effective strategies that could reduce the number of arbitrarily 
discarded samples and also improve trend estimation. These strategies include: (1) using 
forecasts to determine how many samples to test using existing online surveillance systems, (2) 
randomly choosing as many specimens as the capacity permits, and (3) implementing routine 
specimen screening. Further research is needed to evaluate the previously proposed screening 
strategies. These methods can be extrapolated to evaluate the surveillance infrastructure under 
other respiratory viruses with sustained human-to-human transmission such us the respiratory 
syncytial virus (RSV) and the enterovirus D68. 
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